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The March 18, 2002 dialogue on “Religion, Law and Society,” by the Honorable 
Arlin M. Adams” is the inaugural lecture in a series sponsored by The Arlin M. Adams 
Center for Law and Society at Susquehanna University.
Established in 2001, the center focuses on the law and its impact on institutions 
and people, providing a rich learning and experiential resource for students, faculty, 
visiting scholars and members of the community.
The family of Sigfried and Janet Weis and The Degenstein Foundation of Sun-
bury, Pa., with support from the Annenberg Foundation, founded the center in honor 
of prominent Philadelphia jurist Arlin M. Adams whose distinguished legal career 
includes 17 years on the bench of the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
The center explores the significant place law occupies in our ever-changing 
social, political, economic and cultural life. It provides a forum for thought-provoking 
examination of contemporary issues in areas such as human freedoms and civil rights, 
social responsibility, technology and privacy, and constitutional interpretation.
Susquehanna’s emphasis on undergraduate liberal arts education and pre-profes-
sional studies offers an ideal home for the Adams Center which supports activities and 
resources that expose students to the theory and practice of law through internships 
and field experiences, networking, professional seminars, independent study, research 
projects, and enhanced library resources. The interdisciplinary programs and activities 
of the Adams Center enrich and inform civic life in the Central Susquehanna Valley 
and nationally.
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William Penn, the founder of the colony which became the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania, declared in 1682, in the Frame of Government of Pennsylvania, 
that “Government, like clocks, go from the motion men give them; and as govern-
ments are made and moved by men, so by them they are ruined too. Wherefore 
governments rather depend upon men, than men upon governments.”  [1] 
These wise words, if amended to be gender neutral, would be as true today 
as when they were uttered over three centuries ago. And they are as true of the 
judiciary as of the executive and legislative branches of government. To paraphrase 
Penn, ‘Courts, like clocks, go from the motion judges and the citizens give them. 
... Wherefore courts rather depend upon judges and the citizens, than judges and 
citizens upon courts.’
Although this observation might seem self-evident, I mention it because 
Americans appear to have an entirely different view of the judicial power than they 
do of the political process. For many Americans, the courts, particularly the United 
States Supreme Court, seem to be impenetrable and mysterious; in this age of media 
“sound-bites,” the average citizen knows far less about the judicial process and the 
courts and judges than they do about the President and legislators. 
Even though the High Court gained enormous “political” power in the 
twentieth century, it continues to be shrouded in mystery in the eyes of the public. 
Sometimes, perhaps often, this sentiment manifests itself in the idea that judges are 
aloof and distant “platonic guardians” who hand down decisions out of touch with 
the mainstream values and life of the nation.
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In the midst of such attitudes, Penn’s admonition brings us back to reality. 
Judges are also Americans; like other citizens they are influenced to a greater or 
lesser extent by the political, moral, religious and cultural currents of the society 
in which they live. Few of us will forget the 2000 presidential election; Americans 
woke up on November 8th not knowing who their next President would be. For 
the next five weeks, from the morning of November 8th until the Supreme Court 
handed down Bush v. Gore on December 11th, the nation and much of the world 
watched in suspense as the election drama played itself out in high stakes political 
and legal maneuvering.
Despite the bitterness of the controversy, this drama resulted in several posi-
tive developments. It showed the durability of our constitutional system to resolve 
political battles in a peaceful way and it provided a civics lesson to the American 
people on the nature of our government. In addition, the 2000 election controversy 
showed the human side of courts and of judges. One need not be cynical to concede 
that the judges involved in the dispute ruled in accordance with various judicial phi-
losophies influenced by a complex array of personal, professional and jurisprudential 
factors.
Tonight, I will explore this theme of the interaction of courts and judges with 
the society in which they live. As one constitutional law professor has remarked, the 
Supreme Court often has a “dialectical relationship with the mood of the country.” 
Frequently its decisions reflect the society’s prevailing sentiments; at other times, 
cases consolidate various perspectives and prompt public movement in a particular 
direction. Less frequently, courts chart a bold new course considered outside the 
mainstream by many Americans, such as in Brown v. Board of Education, which in 
1954 struck down racial segregation in public schools, and in Roe v. Wade, which 
held in 1973 that the right of privacy protected by the Constitution encompassed, 
within certain limits, a woman’s decision to obtain an abortion.
In considering this topic, I will examine several lines of First Amendment 
precedent which illustrate the way in which courts interact with the social, cultural 
and religious mores of American society. These areas are the case law involving 
Mormons and the practice of polygamy in the latter half of the nineteenth century; 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the flag-salute controversy during the World War II era; 
and the ongoing and contentious issue of public prayer, particularly when public 
schools are involved. 
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Before considering these issues, it is appropriate to make a few comments about 
the First Amendment, particularly the provisions of the First Amendment known 
as the religion clauses, which protect religious liberty and govern the relationship 
between church and state. 
 
Historical Background of the Religion Clauses 
After touring the United States in the 1830’s, the French nobleman Alexis de 
Tocqueville observed that in America “the spirits of religion and of freedom are inti-
mately linked together in joint reign over the land.”
The truth of this observation can be traced to the beginnings of the Republic. 
Before adjourning in the fall of 1789, the First Congress manifested the close con-
nection between religion and freedom in the new nation. On [September 25, 1789] 
the same day it promulgated the Bill of Rights, Congress requested the President to 
proclaim “a day of public thanksgiving and prayer, to be observed by acknowledging, 
with grateful hearts, the many signal favors of Almighty God.” In announcing Thurs-
day, November 26, 1789, to be the first national thanksgiving, President Washington 
urged the American people to unite in prayer and to thank God for “the civil and 
religious liberty with which we are blessed.” Thus, the Founders evidenced devotion 
both to freedom of religion, as guaranteed in the First Amendment, and to the role of 
religion in the public life of the nation.
The First Amendment, promulgated by the First Congress in 1789, established 
four of the pillars of American democracy--the freedoms of religion, speech, press, and 
assembly. The first of these freedoms–the principal topic for this evening--is protected 
in the Amendment’s opening words, “Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” This provision, known as 
the religion clauses, contains two prohibitions against Congress: the first is referred to 
as the establishment clause, the second as the free exercise clause. While the meaning 
and relationship of these two clauses has sparked intense debate, there appears to be 
an emerging consensus among scholars that the Founders intended the clauses to be 
co-guarantors of the core value of religious liberty.
In the nineteenth century, immigrants of various faiths settled in the United 
States and the nation’s cultural life began to change from one dominated by Protes-
tantism, which was the situation at the time the nation was founded, to one character-
ized by religious diversity.
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With the advent of a more pluralistic society, tension began to develop be-
tween America’s historical commitment to religious freedom and to the public role of 
religion. Early in the nation’s history, the inclusion of overtly Christian prayers and 
practices in civic ceremonies provoked little controversy because America was pre-
dominantly Protestant. As the nation became more religiously diverse, however, such 
practices raised questions concerning the obligation of government to maintain a neu-
tral position among the country’s increasing number of faiths. To what extent did the 
Constitution permit the country to officially recognize its Judeo-Christian heritage? 
Did the First Amendment preclude government from sponsoring or permitting prayer 
in public ceremonies and institutions?
It is generally agreed that the establishment clause fosters religious liberty by 
mandating institutional separation of church and state and by requiring government 
to adopt a position of neutrality among religions, neither favoring nor inhibiting one 
faith over others. The free exercise clause augments the principles of separation and 
neutrality with the concept of accommodation, a doctrine that enables — and in some 
cases compels — government to show deference to the religious needs of citizens. One 
of the most prominent historical examples of accommodation is the practice— dat-
ing to colonial times and then to the Continental Congress — of exempting religious 
pacifists from military service.
Contrary to popular misconception, the phrase “separation of church and 
state” does not appear in the Constitution. Roger Williams, the Baptist minister who 
founded Rhode Island as a haven for persecuted dissenters, used the image of a wall of 
separation as early as 1644. Dedicated to protecting the church from worldly corrup-
tion and governmental interference, Williams wrote of the necessity of maintaining 
a “wall of separation between the garden of the Church and the wilderness of the 
world.” Over 150 years later, Thomas Jefferson employed the wall metaphor in a letter 
to the Danbury Baptists in Connecticut. Concerned primarily with insulating govern-
ment from the negative influences of institutional religion, he stated that the First 
Amendment erected “a wall of separation between church and State in behalf of the 
rights of conscience.”
Seizing on Jefferson’s metaphor, the Supreme Court suggested in several early 
cases that the chief purpose of the religion clauses was to effect strict separation of 
church and state. Some Justices went so far as to state that the First Amendment 
demanded a secular society and the broad exclusion of religion from the public square. 
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In more recent decisions, however, the Court has retreated from this stance. In this 
regard, the Court may have been prodded by a feeling among many citizens that the 
Court had gone too far in tilting toward a secular society.
Rather than viewing separation as an end in itself, it now appears that the 
Courts regard this concept as one of several means for achieving religious liberty in a 
free society. In this respect, the Court has moved closer to the position of Justice Ar-
thur Goldberg, who said in 1963 that the basic purpose of the religion clauses is “to 
promote and assure the fullest possible scope of religious liberty and tolerance for all 
and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of attainment of that end.”
In examining the First Amendment, it deserves emphasis that the Founders 
intended its provisions to restrict only the actions of “Congress.” By its language, the 
Amendment limited only the federal government; consequently the Amendment did 
not originally restrain the state legislatures in the realm of church and state. As a re-
sult, several New England states were able to maintain tax-supported Congregational 
establishments well into the nineteenth century. It was not until the first half of the 
twentieth century that the Supreme Court extended certain provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, including the religion clauses, to restrict the scope of state as well as federal 
power. This development resulted from the advent of a judicial concept known as 
incorporation.
Under the incorporation doctrine, the Supreme Court ruled in a series of cases 
that the fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights applied against the states by 
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Adopted in 1868 shortly after the Civil War, 
that brought about a feeling that the basic rights of all citizens should be protected, 
the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” In giving content to this provision, 
known as the “due process clause,” the Court reasoned that the term “liberty” ab-
sorbed or incorporated those guarantees of the Bill of Rights essential for sustaining 
American democracy.
In the 1940’s, the Court concluded that the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment embraced the establishment and free exercise clauses. Thus, the 
Court used the liberty prong of the due process clause to extend the religion clauses, 
originally designed to restrict only Congress, to state governmental action. Given that 
the vast majority of religious freedom issues occurred at the state level, the incorpora-
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tion doctrine dramatically expanded the power of the federal judiciary to determine 
the modern interaction of church and state. 
 
The Supreme Court and Polygamy
Prior to the advent of the incorporation doctrine, the Supreme Court’s role in 
discerning the boundaries between liberty and order and between the establishment 
and free exercise clauses was somewhat limited. Indeed, the Republic had existed 
for over a century before the Court handed down its first decision under the religion 
clauses. In the celebrated case of Reynolds v. United States, rendered in 1879, a unani-
mous Court mirrored the overwhelming sentiment of the time by rejecting the claim 
of a Mormon that his polygamy conviction violated the free exercise of his religion. 
The case was sensational in its day and few, if any, cases since then better illustrate 
the truth that the Court and the Justices who sit on it often reflect the fundamental 
moral, social and cultural commitments of a given era.
The dispute in Reynolds occurred in the territory of Utah, that had been settled 
in the late 1840’s by a group of Mormons under the leadership of Brigham Young, the 
successor to the church’s founder Joseph Smith. In 1852, the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints, commonly known as the Mormon Church, instituted its doc-
trine of “plural marriage.” Under this doctrine, it was a religious duty of all Mormon 
men meeting certain qualifications to marry more than one woman.
The establishment of polygamy in an American territory offended the sensibili-
ties of the nation and provoked an immediate outcry. Polygamy joined slavery as one 
of the major issues of the day; the Republican party platform of 1856 referred to the 
two institutions as the “twin relics of barbarism.” [The following year President Bu-
chanan appointed a non-Mormon to replace Young as Utah’s territorial governor and, 
acting on erroneous information, sent federal troops to crush a nonexistent Mormon 
insurrection.]
Congress responded to the doctrine of plural marriage by launching a campaign 
to uproot the practice. Acting under its plenary power to make “all needful Rules and 
Regulations” for territories, Congress passed criminal legislation banning polygamy in 
Utah and the other territories.
The legislative history of the anti-polygamy laws enacted in the 1860’s and 
1870’s reveal the mores and sentiment of the nation. Monogamy was declared to be 
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“a pillar of American society,” and polygamy was denounced as akin to the barbaric 
practices of non-Christian nations. Congress emphasized that polygamy had always 
been a crime in the Anglo-American tradition; it condemned the Mormon empire 
as “a new Sodom and a new Gomorrah,” concluding that the Mormon church was 
attempting to do in Utah “what has nowhere else been effected by any author-
ity upon this continent--the establishment of one form of religious worship to the 
exclusion of all others.”
Despite the moral indignation provoked by the practice of plural marriage, 
Mormon leaders were convinced that the anti-polygamy laws violated the free 
exercise clause of the First Amendment. As a result, they initiated a test case involv-
ing George Reynolds, a prominent Mormon with two wives, who was serving as 
Brigham Young’s secretary. Reynolds was tried and convicted of bigamy under the 
act. After losing his appeals in the territorial courts, Reynolds took his case to the 
United States Supreme Court. He argued there that his polygamy conviction vio-
lated the free exercise clause because he had married a second wife out of religious 
belief.
The High Court rejected his claim. The opinion for a unanimous Court 
echoed the sentiments of the day. Chief Justice Waite emphasized that polygamy 
had “always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe” and 
that the practice was strictly prohibited and severely punished at common law. This 
outlook was carried over intact to the colonies and then adopted by the new states. 
According to the Chief Justice, there had never been “a time in any State of the 
Union when polygamy ha[d] not been an offence against society, cognizable by the 
civil courts and punishable with more or less severity.”
The Court thought it impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty 
of religious freedom was intended to preclude legislation outlawing polygamy and 
safeguarding monogamous marriage. American society was built upon the concept 
of monogamous marriage and “out of its fruits,” the decision stated, “spring social 
relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily 
required to deal.”
The Court summarily announced the “belief-action” doctrine in constitution-
al law, declaring that “laws are made for the government of actions, and while they 
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” 
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Religiously motivated polygamy was akin to human sacrifice as a part of religious wor-
ship, and who, the Court asked, would “seriously contend[] that the civil government . 
. . could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice?”
The Reynolds case attracted widespread interest. President Hayes ignored a peti-
tion bearing some thirty-two thousand signatures requesting clemency for Reynolds. 
Reynolds served nineteen months in prison and then returned to his Mormon commu-
nity a “living martyr”; in 1885, he married a third time.
One prominent critic of the nation’s handling of the Mormons was the English 
philosopher, John Stuart Mill. He thought the Mormons had “conceded to the hostile 
sentiments of others far more than could justly be demanded,” even to the point of 
establishing “themselves in a remote corner of the earth.” “It is difficult,” Mill added, 
“to see on what principles but those of tyranny they can be prevented from living there 
under what laws they please, provided they commit no aggression on other nations, 
and allow perfect freedom to departure to those who are dissatisfied with their ways.”
In the decade following Reynolds, Congress continued to carry out a relentless 
campaign against polygamy and the Mormon Church, prompting the church finally 
to withdraw support for the practice in 1890. Based on that withdrawal, Utah was per-
mitted to join the Union in 1896. Its new constitution now guaranteed “perfect tolera-
tion of religious sentiment,” but forever prohibited “polygamous or plural marriages.”
Many scholars and commentators have questioned the decision’s durability, 
arguing that it is inconsistent with current social values and legal principles. Some 
modern writers, for example, maintain on the basis of sociological studies that “Mor-
mon polygamy neither caused nor could cause the degradation of women and children 
nor the subversion of democracy.” Other scholars emphasize that the “Victorian age of 
[Chief Justice] Morrison Waite is far behind us” and that polygamy should be legalized 
because social attitudes and judicial precedent have dramatically changed since the late 
nineteenth century. The shared public values inspired by cultural Protestantism, they 
argue, have given way to moral relativism and to a search for consensus values suffi-
ciently broad to provide social cohesion while accommodating cultural pluralism. 
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The Supreme Court and the Flag-Salute Controversy
Perhaps there are a few of us in the audience who are old enough to remember 
December 6th, 1941, when the Japanese Empire attacked Pearl Harbor. Most of us 
from the World War II generation remember where we were and what we were doing 
when we heard about that terrible event. I suspect that few of us thought that we 
would live to witness another attack of such magnitude on America. Unfortunately, 
September 11th, 2001, shocked us all.
Despite the initial shock, Americans--with few exceptions--have responded to 
the tragedy with courage, compassion and resolve. September 11th galvanized the 
nation; we have rallied around the President, the flag and our way of life. Confronted 
with the repressive measures of the Taliban regime, we have gained a deeper apprecia-
tion of our own constitutional heritage of liberty and the rule of law. Yet, as in other 
wartime periods, the delicate balance underlying the Constitution is being tested: 
What is the proper balance between civil liberties and public safety during wartime? 
What does it mean to be patriotic when a nation is at war? To what extent, if at all, 
can ethnicity, physical appearance or beliefs be used in searching for potential ter-
rorists? What rights should be afforded to suspects, detainees, criminals or POW’s 
during wartime?
These questions are not new; the nation has wrestled with them throughout 
many periods. During the World War II era, for example, the United States faced the 
delicate issue of how to treat Japanese Americans in the midst of growing fears of an 
invasion on the West Coast. In hindsight many now believe that political and mili-
tary authorities failed to strike the proper balance between civil liberties and security, 
leading to the detention of numerous patriotic Japanese Americans.
During World War II, the nation also confronted sensitive questions arising 
from the beliefs and actions of a small sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Just 
as the Mormons shaped free exercise jurisprudence in the polygamy cases of the 
nineteenth century, the Jehovah’s Witnesses exerted a pronounced influence on the 
development of religious freedom in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, 
between 1938 and 1943, the Supreme Court to sixteen cases involving the Witnesses 
and the exercise of First Amendment rights. The most celebrated of these cases dealt 
with the refusal of the Jehovah’s Witnesses to obey laws requiring their children to 
salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance in public schools.
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To place the flag-salute controversy in context, it might be helpful to say a few 
words about the Witnesses and their beliefs regarding civil authority. Founded by Charles 
T. Russell in Pittsburgh, the Jehovah’s Witnesses began in the 1870s as a small Bible 
study group with a zeal for evangelism. The group, also known as the Watchtower So-
ciety, became controversial because of its aggressive methods of proselytizing, defiance 
of civil authority and condemnation of all organized religion and government as evil. In 
1917, under the leadership of Judge Joseph Rutherford, the Society published and widely 
distributed The Finished Mystery, an inflammatory work denouncing patriotism and the 
power of government to wage war. The following year, Rutherford and seven other Wit-
ness leaders were convicted under the Espionage Act for obstructing the draft and causing 
insubordination in the military. All eight spent time in prison before their convictions 
were reversed.
After World War I, Rutherford converted the Watchtower Society into a highly 
disciplined group with a renewed commitment to proselytizing. Regarding themselves as 
aliens in an evil world, the Witnesses attacked all institutional religion and shunned in-
volvement in government, politics, and the armed forces. As early as 1929, Rutherford had 
stressed that Jehovah’s Witnesses were not subject to the “earthly powers.” He repudiated 
all temporal wars, but rejected complete pacifism, asserting that Witnesses could use force 
when threatened with personal injury or the destruction of their proselytizing materials.
The onset of World War II intensified social antagonism towards the Witnesses. 
Their difficulties during the war stemmed primarily from the conviction that obeisance to 
temporal authorities constituted idolatry because earthly governments were hopelessly evil. 
As a result, they refused to allow their children to salute the flag and recite the pledge of 
allegiance in public schools; in addition, they opposed the draft on the grounds that it vio-
lated God’s law and interfered with their missionary work. Although the Society’s active 
membership numbered under 100,000, over 4,000 Witnesses were imprisoned for violat-
ing selective service laws; two-thirds of all conscientious objectors in prison at the time.
More controversial than the Witnesses’ opposition to the draft, however, was their 
noncompliance with flag-salute laws. This stance, more than any other, branded them “un-
patriotic,” bringing with it social stigma and the wrath of a nation at war. With the cur-
rent “war on terrorism” and the resurgence of patriotism and flag-waving, we can perhaps 
appreciate, at least somewhat, how ostracized the Witnesses were during World War II.
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The flag-salute laws found objectionable by the Watchtower Society originat-
ed in 1898, when New York passed a statute mandating the opening of each public 
school day with a salute to the flag and other suitable “patriotic exercises.” By 1940, 
every state had enacted legislation requiring public schools to foster good citizenship 
through courses such as civics and social studies or through patriotic exercises such 
as the salute and pledge of allegiance.
The Watchtower Society began to challenge the various flag-salute laws 
in the courts in the 1930s. Appealing to the fundamental freedoms of the First 
Amendment, the Witnesses argued that the compulsory ceremony violated their 
deeply-held religious belief that any sign of obeisance to the state is an idolatrous act 
jeopardizing one’s salvation. [2] 
In America, Judge Rutherford thrust the Society into the flag-salute issue 
in 1935, when he delivered a radio address commending a Witness schoolboy for 
refusing to participate in the flag ceremony of a public school in Lynn, Massachu-
setts. The address galvanized the Witnesses to undertake a dogged campaign against 
flag-salute laws. Within a year, some 120 Witness children had been expelled from 
public schools because of their unwillingness to participate in flag ceremonies. By 
the close of the 1940 school year, over 200 expulsions in some sixteen states had oc-
curred, more than half in Pennsylvania.
Witness children were not only expelled from public schools, in some instanc-
es they were adjudged to be juvenile delinquents and committed to state facilities. In 
addition, parents were often fined for failing to keep their non-saluting children in 
school in compliance with compulsory education laws. The Witnesses responded by 
establishing their own “Kingdom Schools,” or by enrolling their children in private 
schools.
Given its unpopularity, the Watchtower Society was convinced that attempts 
to effect change through the political process would prove futile. The Witnesses 
therefore appealed to the courts, arguing that the compulsory flag-salute laws 
violated substantive due process, the religion clauses, and the free speech clause. 
Litigation in seven states between 1935 and 1940 led to uniformly unfavorable deci-
sions on these constitutional claims. As a general rule, the courts concluded that the 
flag salute was a secular ceremony designed to promote patriotism, a legitimate and 
important state interest.
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The Supreme Court first addressed the question in 1940 in a Pennsylvania 
case called Minersville School District v. Gobitis. The case came to the Court 
heightened by patriotic fervor and by volatile emotions arising from the Nazis use 
of a salute among the Hitler youth. Two Jehovah’s Witness children were expelled 
from public schools for refusing to salute the flag and recite the pledge of allegiance.
To comply with Pennsylvania’s compulsory education law, their parents en-
rolled them in private schools. Their father then filed suit, seeking to enjoin authori-
ties from conditioning public school attendance on participation in the flag-salute 
ceremony. A federal district court granted the request for an injunction and the 
court of appeals affirmed.
By a vote of 8 to 1, the United States Supreme Court reversed the court of 
appeals. In an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the Court held that compelling the 
salute over religious objections did not violate the liberty guaranteed by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. It assumed that government possessed the authority 
to require the flag-salute and pledge of allegiance and therefore framed the issue as 
whether the Constitution mandated excusal for those religiously opposed to such a 
compulsory exercise.
In reviewing “the course of the long struggle for religious toleration,” the 
Court concluded that “[c]onscientious scruples ha[d] not . . . relieved the indi-
vidual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of 
religious beliefs.” Applying this standard, known as the “secular regulation rule,” 
the majority decided that the school board was not required to excuse the Gobitis 
children from a ceremony designed to promote “national cohesion.” Justice Frank-
furter characterized the state’s interest in fostering such cohesion as “inferior to none 
in the hierarchy of legal values”; he emphasized that the flag played a vital role in 
fostering civil cohesion, for it was the symbol of “our national unity, transcending 
all internal differences.”
Justice Stone was the lone dissenter. He thought the flag-salute law to be 
“unique in the history of Anglo-American legislation” because it not only suppressed 
freedom of speech and religion, it sought to coerce children to adopt beliefs contrary 
to their own. Given the fundamental rights at stake, he argued that the state had an 
obligation to accommodate the dissenting children, and if need be to inculcate pa-
triotism through less intrusive means such as instruction about the nation’s history 
and institutions.
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The Gobitis decision ignited a firestorm of controversy. It failed to quell 
mounting criticisms of the compulsory flag-salute ceremony and provoked a large 
volume of negative commentary in legal, educational, and religious journals.
In an article capturing the sentiment of many critics, a law professor declared 
that the Court’s emphasis on national unity “turns sour” when one realizes it was 
used to justify “the brutal compulsion which requires a sensitive and conscientious 
child to stultify himself in public.” Another telling criticism, written by two Justice 
Department attorneys, asserted that the Court had failed to come to grips with 
the reality of widespread social violence against a small, marginalized religion. A 
minister writing in the Christian Century likened the unpopularity of the Jehovah 
Witnesses’ to that of the early Christians, who were despised by “highly respectable 
and patriotic Romans” because “they refused to put their pinch of salt upon the 
altars of the Roman emperor.”
Widespread and intense persecution of the Jehovah’s Witnesses ensued in 
the wake of the Gobitis decision. In the weeks following the decision, “hundreds of 
attacks upon the Witnesses were reported to the Department of Justice.” They were 
beaten by mobs, run out of towns, tarred and feathered, jailed without charges, and 
left in prison without justification. Angry citizens destroyed their personal property 
and burned their sanctuaries and religious literature.
Violence against the Witnesses erupted in numerous states, persisting 
throughout the summer and into the fall of 1940. After a brief lull, the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor rekindled public anger toward the sect. The result was an in-
crease in acts of violence, arbitrary arrests, and the use of questionable ordinances to 
suppress proselytizing. Incidents of persecution remained at a high level for another 
six months. Fortified by the Gobitis decision, many additional communities passed 
laws requiring the flag ceremony in public schools. Witness children -- perhaps as 
many as 2,000 by 1943 -- were expelled from schools in at least thirty-one states.
Although Gobitis had been decided by a vote of 8-to-1, it took only three 
years for its authority to be undermined. Most state courts and a majority of legal, 
religious and social commentators deplored the decision. Many regarded it as a 
major cause behind the increased persecution of the Witnesses. The Justices on 
the United States Supreme Court were not oblivious to such criticisms. They were 
reading the same journals, newspapers and magazines as other Americans. Mount-
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ing criticism prompted Justices Black and Douglas, who had joined the majority in 
Gobitis, to announce in a 1942 Jehovah’s Witness case that they no longer agreed with 
Gobitis and its rationale. In particular, they expressed concern that the decision had 
contributed to exposing a helpless religious minority to increased societal violence.
The defection of Justices Black and Douglas, coupled with the arrival on the 
Court of Frank Murphy and Wiley Rutledge, made it likely that Gobitis and the flag-
salute question would be revisited. In 1943, just three years after Gobitis, the High 
Court did exactly that in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. Clearly 
influenced by social mores and trends and by the widespread criticisms of Gobitis, the 
Barnette Court overruled Gobitis; in the process, it took pains to repudiate every major 
premise of its prior decision.
In a landmark opinion written by Justice Jackson, the Court ruled 6 to 3 that 
a law “compelling the flag salute and pledge [of allegiance] transcends constitutional 
limitations ... and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the 
First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.” Remarkable 
in its breadth, the decision transformed the question from whether government must 
excuse dissenting children from a compulsory patriotic exercise to whether govern-
ment possessed any authority at all to impose such a compulsory exercise. In a revealing 
sentence, the Court declared that in a democracy, “Authority . . . is to be controlled by 
public opinion, not public opinion by authority.”
Given this new, broader understanding of the flag-salute controversy, the Court 
stressed the historical dangers and ineffectual nature of governmental attempts to pro-
mote national unity through force and coercion. “Ultimate futility of such attempts to 
compel coherence,” the Court said, “is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman 
drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a 
means of religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means of Russian unity, 
down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.” Justice Jackson 
underscored the breadth of the Court’s rationale in memorable language: “If there is 
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can 
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”
While the Reynolds decision demonstrates the significant degree to which indi-
vidual Justices and the Court are shaped by the fundamental social mores of a given 
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era, the flag-salute controversy illustrates that the “dialectical relationship” between 
the Court and the “mood of the country” can sometimes be extremely fluid and 
dramatic. Indeed, the criticism of Gobitis was so intense that it took the Justices 
only three years to overrule. In Barnette, the Court made it clear, in “subtext” so 
to speak, that it had heard the academic and social commentary on the flag-salute 
controversy “loud and clear.”
The next topic we shall consider--that of the Supreme Court and public 
prayer--also illustrates this “dialectical relationship”; however, the public prayer 
question has proven to be not only dramatic, but persistent and enigmatic as well. 
 
The Supreme Court and Public Prayer
Few areas of constitutional law have created as much interest as the Court’s 
decisions on public prayer, particularly when the cases involve public schools. Dur-
ing national election years, candidates invariably address this question with heated 
rhetoric. This was the case, for example, in 1992 in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lee v. Weisman. In Lee, the Court concluded that an invocation and 
benediction offered by a Rabbi at a public school graduation violated the establish-
ment clause because the exercise provided coercive support for religion. Political 
candidates in that election year either denounced or praised the decision. As we 
shall see, the debate and the cases continue on this sensitive topic. Although time 
only permits a review of some of the Court’s major decisions involving public prayer, 
it will become apparent that the Justices themselves are divided and, in some cases, 
the Court appears to have vacillated in accordance with social currents and moods.
From the mid-twentieth century the United States Supreme Court has 
emerged as an important institution in addressing these questions and in determin-
ing the relationship between church and state. Since 1962, the Court has rendered 
several notable decisions involving public prayer. These decisions have considered 
such questions as the constitutionality of including prayer exercises in public 
schools, opening legislative sessions with invocations, permitting high school stu-
dents to gather voluntarily for prayer and Bible study, and offering invocations and 
benedictions at public occasions such as graduation ceremonies.
The importance of the incorporation doctrine, discussed earlier tonight, is 
illustrated by the Supreme Court’s cases in the 1960’s on prayer and Bible reading in 
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the public schools. Prior to these decisions, such practices had been the subject of de-
bate at the state and local levels for well over a century. The high courts of over twenty 
states had ruled on the question of religious exercises in the public schools, with most 
approving of Bible reading and related activities. In light of this precedent, it is not 
surprising that the Supreme Court’s intervention in the area triggered widespread 
controversy.
In Engel v. Vitale, a New York school district directed classes to open each 
school day by reciting a brief prayer composed by state officials: “Almighty God, we 
acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our 
parents, our teachers and our Country.” Parents opposed to the prayer exercise could 
arrange to have their children excused from the recitation. The Supreme Court ruled 
in 1962 that the school district had breached the wall of separation between church 
and state.
The establishment clause, Justice Black declared, must at least mean that “it is 
no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the 
American people to recite.” One of the reasons many of the colonists left England, he 
added, was to escape governmental control over prayer and other religious practices. 
While most colonies initially preferred the Congregational or Anglican churches, by 
the time of the Revolution many had recognized the dangers of enforcing religious 
uniformity and had granted liberty of conscience. History had demonstrated that “a 
union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade reli-
gion.” Acknowledging the important role played by religion in the nation’s history, the 
Court emphasized that its decision did not extend to “patriotic or ceremonial” refer-
ences to the Deity.
The lone dissenter, Justice Stewart, argued that the Court was denying school 
children the opportunity to share “in the spiritual heritage of our Nation.” History 
disclosed numerous instances of governmental dependence upon God, he pointed out. 
For example, Congress began each of its daily sessions with prayer; all the Presidents 
had invoked God’s assistance in their inaugural addresses; and for over one hundred 
years the Court crier had opened its sessions with, “God save the United States and 
this Honorable Court.”
A year after Engel, the Court confronted the socially volatile issue of Bible 
reading in public schools. In Abington School District v. Schempp, parents of school 
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children challenged Pennsylvania and Maryland laws requiring Bible reading or 
recitation of the Lord’s prayer at the beginning of each public school day. Under the 
Pennsylvania law, parents who objected to the devotional practices could arrange to 
have their children excused. The Schempps testified that they had decided not to use 
the excusal provision because of fear that their children would be labeled “oddballs” 
by their classmates.
With only Justice Stewart dissenting, the Supreme Court struck down the 
Bible reading laws under the establishment clause. While recognizing that “our 
national life reflects a religious people,” Justice Clark’s opinion stressed that reli-
gious freedom is “strongly imbedded in our public and private life” and “indispens-
able” in a pluralistic society. By requiring pupils to participate in Bible reading and 
prayer, the public schools had impermissibly advanced religion “in violation of the 
command of the First Amendment that the Government maintain strict neutrality, 
neither aiding nor opposing religion.” Although the establishment clause prohibited 
state-sponsored devotional exercises, the Court stated that nothing in the Constitu-
tion precluded the objective study of the Bible and religion in the public schools. 
To preserve religion’s exalted place in society, Clark declared that the nation must 
continue to rely on the private sector, “on the home, the church and the inviolable 
citadel of the individual heart and mind.”
Forty years after Engel and Schempp, many Americans take these decisions 
for granted. At the time, however, they produced a storm of controversy, generating 
widespread debate among politicians, religious leaders, educators, and journalists. 
Former Presidents Hoover and Eisenhower denounced Engel and President Ken-
nedy, prompted by great public outcry, urged the American people to obey the Su-
preme Court’s rulings even when they disagreed with them. The “very easy remedy,” 
he proclaimed was for families to “pray a good deal more at home” and to “make 
the true meaning of prayer much more important in the lives of all of our children.” 
Regarding Engel and Schempp as tragic mistakes, numerous members of Congress 
sought to abrogate the decisions through a constitutional amendment. Despite 
repeated attempts Congress has never approved such a course. [3]
Two decades after its school prayer decisions, the Supreme Court considered 
the constitutionality of legislative prayer in Marsh v. Chambers (1983). Since 1965, 
the Nebraska legislature had paid a Presbyterian minister to serve as its chaplain and 
to open its daily sessions with prayer. In rejecting the contention that Nebraska’s 
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legislative chaplaincy contravened the establishment clause, the Court emphasized 
that the opening of public bodies with prayer was “deeply embedded in the history 
and tradition of this country.”
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Chief Justice Burger noted that the Continental 
Congress opened its sessions with prayer in 1774 and that the First Congress ap-
pointed paid chaplains for each House in the same week it promulgated the First 
Amendment. In light of the views of the Founders and an “unbroken history of 
more than 200 years,” legislative chaplains and prayers had become “part of the 
fabric of our society.” As such, a legislature’s invocation of Divine guidance was “a 
tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.” 
The Chief Justice added that unlike impressionable school children, legislators are 
not as susceptible to indoctrination and peer pressure.
In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the Court for relying almost entirely 
on history. Arguing that “the Constitution is not a static document, whose mean-
ing on every detail is fixed for all time by the life experience of the Framers,” he 
stressed that Americans had become a vastly more diverse people since the time of 
the Founders. Given modern America’s pluralism, Brennan thought it clear that 
legislative prayer violated the principles of separation and neutrality secured by the 
establishment clause.
While the school prayer decisions banned devotional activities as part of the 
public school curriculum, they did not forbid children from voluntarily praying in 
school. Certainly Engel and Schempp did not preclude a pupil from offering thanks 
over lunch or from sharing a religious experience as part of a classroom exercise at 
Thanksgiving. But what about students gathering together during free time to pray 
and discuss spiritual matters? The Supreme Court cast light on this question in 
1990 in Westside Community Board of Education v. Mergens; this case considered 
a claim that the Equal Access Act violated the establishment clause.
Congress passed the Equal Access Act in 1984 because it believed school 
boards were excluding student religious groups from high schools on the basis of 
a mistaken interpretation of the establishment clause. The law sought to end such 
discrimination by prohibiting public high schools with forums for non-curriculum 
student clubs from denying “equal access” to clubs desiring to meet for religious, po-
litical, or philosophical purposes. In Mergens, eight Justices rejected the contention 
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that the Equal Access Act impermissibly advanced or endorsed religion. Instead, 
the Act afforded student religious groups the same opportunity to meet as a host of 
secular clubs, such as chess, dramatics, choir, or photography, or an honor society.
A custom that appeared to fall somewhere between the school prayer for-
bidden in Engel and the legislative prayer sustained in Marsh was the inclusion 
of invocations and benedictions in graduation ceremonies. Did commencement 
prayers impermissibly advance religion, or were they a tolerable acknowledgment of 
religion’s traditional role in public life?
Under a policy adopted by the public school system of Providence, Rhode Is-
land, principals were permitted to invite members of the clergy to offer commence-
ment prayers. When the principal of a middle school invited a Rabbi to deliver the 
invocation and benediction at the school’s graduation, a parent of a graduating pupil 
filed a lawsuit alleging that the exercise transgressed the establishment clause. In Lee 
v. Weisman, decided in 1992, the High Court agreed with the parent.
Speaking through Justice Kennedy, the Court stated that “the Constitution 
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in reli-
gion or its exercise.” The school board violated this precept by entangling itself with 
graduation prayer to such an extent that it was essentially sponsoring a religious ac-
tivity at a school function. In reaching this conclusion, Kennedy pointed out that a 
public official, Principal Lee, decided to include prayer in the commencement, chose 
a clergyman for this purpose, and attempted to control the content of the prayers by 
advising the Rabbi that they should be nonsectarian.
As a result, the Rabbi’s invocation and benediction bore the imprint of the 
State and exerted subtle yet significant psychological pressure “on attending students 
to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the prayers.” This 
indirect coercion, which could be as real as “overt compulsion,” left objecting pupils 
with no realistic way to avoid the appearance of participation in the commencement 
prayers. [According to the majority, “the injury caused by the government’s action ... 
[was] that the State, in a school setting, in effect required participation in a religious 
exercise.”] Declaring that religious expression is too precious to be proscribed or 
prescribed by the State, Kennedy concluded that “the design of the Constitution is 
that preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility 
and a choice committed to the private sphere.”
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Justice Scalia wrote a strident dissent joined by three colleagues. The dis-
senters charged the Court with depriving public schools of the opportunity to 
participate in the nation’s long tradition of “public ceremonies featuring prayers of 
thanksgiving and petition.” Describing the concept of psychological coercion as 
“boundlessly manipulable,” Scalia regarded as fanciful the belief that merely stand-
ing or sitting in respectful silence during the commencement prayers constituted 
psychologically forced participation in a religious ritual.
This overview of some of the Court’s major decisions involving public prayer 
reveals that “[t]he spirit of religion and of freedom,” referred to by Tocqueville over a 
century and a half ago, still continue to be closely related. The Supreme Court cases 
on public prayer illustrate the relationship between these two forces in a society 
made up of many faiths. On the one hand, the Court has recognized the vital role 
of religion in history and culture by sustaining legislative prayer and the right of stu-
dent religious groups to meet voluntarily in public high schools. On the other hand, 
it has ruled that the establishment clause forbids state-sponsored prayer in the public 
schools and coercive invocations and benedictions at graduation ceremonies. 
 
Conclusion 
Tonight’s topic -- “Religion, Law and Society”–implicates many of the themes 
of human existence, including the duties owed to the Creator and to Caesar, the 
relationship between religion and government, the authority of civil government, 
civic virtue and the limits of human freedom, the quest for the common good in a 
free society and the role of liberty of conscience and civil disobedience. We have ex-
plored some of these themes in the context of the Supreme Court’s decisions involv-
ing polygamy, the flag-salute controversy and public prayer. From these three lines 
of First Amendment precedent, we have seen how judges and courts have interacted 
with the social, cultural and religious mores of society.
The Reynolds decision illustrates the degree to which judges reflect the 
fundamental moral ethos of a given era. No matter how compelling the Mormon 
claim might have been in Reynolds, it was not very probable that a nineteenth-cen-
tury Court influenced by Victorian morality would have sanctioned the practice of 
polygamy, whether motivated by religious convictions or not.
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The flag-salute controversy shows how influential social currents and com-
mentary can be in changing the course of the Supreme Court. That the Justices 
were listening carefully to societal voices is exemplified, for example, by the changed 
attitudes of Justices Black and Douglas.
The Court’s decisions on public prayer reveal sharp divisions among the Jus-
tices and a Court which appears to vacillate in light of the “mood of the country.”
Irrespective of the holdings in particular cases, most Justices seem to agree 
that religion is a vital, public force in the life of the nation. In this respect, they have 
apparently rejected the view that religious symbols and ceremonies in public life are 
largely vestiges of the supposed civil deism of the Founding generation. The Court 
now seems more willing to recognize a legitimate public role for religion in main-
taining a free society.
Underlying many of the issues is the fundamental concept, expressed by 
Justice Douglas: “We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being.”
It is helpful to remember that many judges, like many other American citi-
zens, are religious; they pray, read scripture, try to live charitably in accordance with 
their beliefs and bring their consciences, as informed by religious convictions and 
other factors, to their duties on the bench. 
In 1628, Edward Coke, Chief Justice of England, declared that, “The known 
certainties of the law is the safetie of all. [4]” He was suggesting that it was neces-
sary for citizens to understand what was acceptable conduct and what was not. 
Almost two hundred years later, in 1819, John Marshall, then Chief Justice of the 
United States, stated, “We must never forget that it is a constitution that we are ex-
pounding.” [5] What Marshall was suggesting was that in Constitutional interpre-
tation a certain amount of flexibility is required in order that this great document 
reflect changes in our society and in our evolving nation.
This, then, seems to be one of the important lessons of the interpretation of 
the religion clauses of the First Amendment to our Constitution.
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